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The Cloncurry region is likely to have the same impression 
on a modern visitor as it had on the inveterate traveller A.C.C. Lock, 
who in 1949, despaired having reached "the end of the world". The 
relentless heat and windswept dust which rolled across the desolate 
red earth remained a lasting memory. Today pastoral activities 
preoccupy local residents: but sixty years ago the Cloncurry region 
boasted the largest copperfield in Australia. Over seven thousand 
people lived amid the din of mining machinery, the piercing whistles 
of brightly lit ore trains and the calescence of smelter furnaces at 
night. Between 1910 and 1920 mining companies operating on the 
Cloncurry field commanded the attention of both the London and 
Melbourne stock exchanges. But like most boom fields, it surrendered 
to adversity and the mining camps of the region were abandoned. Only 
the scarred topography and rusting scrap iron unable to be salvaged 
now remains as testimony to the heyday of the Cloncurry copper empire. 
Three large companies dominated mining and smelting 
activities: Mount Elliott Limited, Hampden-Cloncurry Copper Mines 
Limited, and the less glamorous Mount Cuthbert No Liability. Their 
output was sold to Germany initially, and, after the outbreak of 
hostilities in 1914, through the Australian government for processing 
in British armament factories. No sooner was the armistice signed than 
the Imperial government released its hold on the copper market with 
almost devastating consequences for most major copper producing centres. 
Copper prices plummeted and did not recover until another holocaust in 
Europe created new demands for copper. By then, only a few gougers 
worked the mines on tribute, struggling to earn a living. The history 
of the copper enterprises in north-west Queensland has not been the 
subject of research, with one exception. In 1960, Geoffrey Blainey 
compiled an account in the early chapters of his Mines in the Splnifex: 
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The Story of Mount Isa Mines. This paper, while covering many of the 
aspects already investigated by Blainey, elaborates on the vicissitudes 
of the companies, the manoeuvrings of the management and the role of 
the labour force. Moreover, it illustrates weaknesses in company 
organisation and financing, and miscalculations in strategy which have 
characterised many Australian mining enterprises. 
Far from being a recent find, the lodes of the Cloncurry 
copper field were first discovered by the irascible Ernest Henry in 
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1867. Henry named his claim the Great Australia mine, and after 
failing to raise sufficient capital to develop the ore bodies decided 
to undertake the task himself with the assistance of a group of Cousin 
Jacks whom he recruited personally in England. Only a few parcels of 
ore were mined before want of capital, lack of smelting facilities and 
high transport costs forced the mine's closure. In 1884, after 
discovering extensive ore bodies at Argylla and Mount Oxide to the 
north-west, Henry sold the Great Australia to a Glasgow syndicate, the 
Cloncurry Copper Mining and Smelting Company, whose principals had 
received a favourable geologist's report from J.R. Robertson, later of 
Mount Lyell fame. The company erected smelters at Cloncurry, engaged 
nearly two hundred men, but was forced to abandon smelting and close 
down the mine in 1889 after producing only four hundred tons of 
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copper. It was fully a decade before interest was revived in the 
region by a rise in world copper prices and the activities of a group 
of Melbourne-based promoters. 
In 1897 world prices for copper increased dramatically as 
the nineties "were going out in wars and rumours of wars". By 1899, 
copper was fetching over £75 per ton, the highest price for over a 
decade. The renewed interest in base metals was reflected in the 
clamour for Mount Lyell shares which accounted for a substantial 
proportion of transactions on the Melbourne Stock Exchange. A.R. Hall, 
historian of the Melbourne Stock Exchange, asserts that the Tasmanian 
THE PROFITS OF BOOM 
mines gave a speculative impetus to the mining sector: "Mount 
Lyell's maiden dividend at the rate of over 23 per cent on its paid 
up capital provided the main stimulus". This opened up 
"considerable opportunities for mining company promoters and for 
speculative dealers in mining shares". New regions were unlocked, 
the most notable being the Chillagoe district in far north 
Queensland. Spearheading the development of new mines was a coterie 
of men labelled by Blainey - "The Magnates": William Knox, William 
Jamleson, William Orr, J.S. Reid, Herman Schlapp, W.L. Baillieu, 
Harvey Patterson and H.F.C. Keats, who had made their fortunes at 
Broken Hill and then Mount Lyell, were connected with nearly every 
new enterprise in the base metal industry. Blainey insists they were 
"entrepreneurs rather than capitalists"; "their main contribution was 
not large sums of capital but small sums which they invested in the 
first years when the risk of failure was high". Not only did they 
make "some of the most courageous and sensible decisions in the 
history of Australian business" but they had a capacity for 
. 8 inspiring confidence among investors. 
In the same year Mount Lyell was exciting Melbourne 
investors, three of these men - Orr, Schlapp and Knox - turned their 
attention to the lodes in the Cloncurry region, and acquired 
properties at Hampden, forty miles south of Cloncurry. Outlaying only 
small amounts of capital, they financed systematic exploration of the 
ore deposits and preliminary development, stock piling the bulk of 
the ores extracted and transporting small parcels with high metal 
contents to southern smelters. Almost simultaneously a property to 
the south of Hampden, known as Mount Elliott, was acquired by John 
Moffat, the enterprising Scot who pioneered tin and silver-lead 
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mining in the Herberton district. Both the Hampden and Mount 
Elliott concerns showed shrewd judgment and patience, conscious of 
the experience of the Cloncurry Copper Mining and Smelting Company 
two decades beforehand: "Their directors refused to imitate the folly 
of the Great Australia in erecting smelters before the ore reserves 
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had been proved; instead they slowly developed the ore-bodies and 
waited for those favourable conditions which the field had not yet 
achieved."^ '^  The "favourable conditions" comprised lower transport 
costs, the availability of speculative capital, and stable metal 
prices. 
Transport costs had been the major obstacle for Henry and 
later the Cloncurry Copper Mining and Smelting Company. The closest 
port was Normanton, over two hundred miles to the north and outlet for 
the Croydon gold field. To the east lay Townsville, nearly five 
hundred miles distant. A railway to the Gulf of Carpentaria had long 
been the dream of pastoralists and gougers in north-west Queensland, 
but for over two decades hopes were continuously deferred. The 
Mcllwraith government proposed a transcontinental railway from the 
Gulf to Roma to be financed by British capital in return for land 
grants in 1883, only to be defeated by Griffith and his supporters at 
the polls that same year. Hostile to any form of land grant railway, 
the new government proposed instead a state-constructed line to 
Normanton. Plans for the Cloncurry-Normanton section were adopted by 
the parliament in 1886, but before construction was commenced, 
appropriations were transferred to a line from Normanton to Croydon, 
where gold yields had returned remarkable results since the field's 
discovery the previous year. Four years later, parliament again 
appropriated funds for the Cloncurry-Normanton line, and rails and 
fastenings were unloaded at the Gulf port. Again the line was never 
constructed: a financial crisis culminating in the collapse of the 
12 Queensland National Bank torpedoed the project. Cloncurry still 
relied on the Cobb and Co. service from Richmond, and the irregular 
but costly haulage of private teamsters and camel trains. The 
Cloncurry-Normanton railway project was resurrected in 1901: 
enabling legislation for its construction by private enterprise was 
passed, but the syndicate delayed until 1906 when their £100,000 
13 deposit was declared forfeit by the Morgan government. In 1905, the 
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government finally decided to proceed with a railway to the north west. 
This connected Cloncurry to Richmond, thus giving the region access 
to the port of Townsville 250 miles more distant than Normanton. 
However, it was purely a cost factor which determined the matter as 
the Richmond-Cloncurry link required only 170 miles of new line and 
less expensive infrastructure. No doubt, the state also considered 
the additional advantage of substantially greater freight returns 
from mineral haulages over the longer distance. The first train 
from Richmond was welcomed by Cloncurry residents in December 1908, 
signalling an end to the isolation and prohibitive transport costs of 
teamsters which had impeded the unlocking of the field's mineral 
wealth. 
By the time the communication problems were overcome, capital 
was readily available, as British Investors had turned to Australian 
mining after disillusioning experiences with foreign railway projects, 
banks and financial houses. The substantial dividends yielded by 
Mount Lyell, Mount Morgan, Broken Hill and Western Australian gold 
mines spurred speculation in Australian mining scrip. New mining 
company listings on the Melbourne stock exchange between 1896 and 1900 
were almost double those for the preceeding five years, and the trend 
was sustained during the first decade of the twentieth century as a 
result of British capital inflow. "While other forms of British 
investment in Australia languished", comments Hall, "there was a 
relatively large flow into mining." Promoters and mine managers 
competed for British money to open up new fields, and in some cases, 
to reopen abandoned mines. Many of these new mining companies 
failed partly because promoters tended to splurge working capital on 
expensive machinery, rarely assessing ore reserves with any degree of 
thoroughness, and partly because investors sought immediate returns 
on their outlays once mining was commenced. Geoffrey Blainey 
succinctly relates the pattern: 
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Optimistic directors, spurred on by 
dividend-hungry shareholders, gambled 
on making enough to finance further 
exploration or pay a dividend. This 
practice was accentuated by the system 
of time payment of shares which 
characterized the "No Liability" 
mining company. If the mine took too 
long to pay, many shareholders tended 
to forfeit their shares rather than 
pay more calls to the old company. 
Further, Blainey claims that forfeitures were "infectious" but a 
company "which refused to erect machinery might be left with few 
shareholders who collectively were too poor to finance the high cost 
of mining difficult terrain." Consequently, many mines were 
prematurely abandoned after the surface lodes were exhausted, earning 
for some Australian promoters notoriety for dubious financial practices. 
On the other hand, the more financially conservative British 
investors sought mining debentures, the most secure form of investment. 
The practice of underwriting new developments by debenture Issues 
became increasingly appealing: these were fixed interest securities, 
attracting specified rates of interest and the repayment of the 
principal at maturity date, raised against the assets of the company. 
By 1914, many Australian mining ventures were British controlled as a 
result of under-writing capital expansion in London. 
Copper prices steadily increased to over £100 a ton by 1906. 
With the railway link to the field due to be completed within two 
years, the mine owners at Cloncurry decided that "favourable 
conditions" now existed, and floated their properties into public 
companies which were registered on both the Australian and London stock 
exchanges. The Hampden mines were floated in March 1906 to tap 
speculative capital. Registered in Victoria as Hampden-Cloncurry Copper 
Mines Limited, the new company acquired the mines held by Orr, Knox 
and Schlapp for one half of its registered share capital of 200,000 £1 
shares. Of the remaining 100,000 shares, 25,000 were earmarked for 
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subscribers in Australia, 25,000 were issued to British investors, 
and the balance was held in reserve. The flotation attracted 
widespread interest: 57,523 applications were received for the 
Australian allotment and over 40,000 applications were lodged with 
London brokers. Soon after, the Hampden company greatly enhanced 
its assets by acquiring the promising Duchess deposits in return for 
15,000 of its reserve shares and a £15,000 cash settlement, thus 
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reducing working capital to £35,000. The Mount Elliott properties 
were floated in Melbourne the same year, but within a few months 
British investors managed to take over the venture by forming Mount 
Elliott Limited, registered in London and Victoria in June 1907. The 
new company had a share capital of £750,000 divided into 150,000 
shares of £5 each, of which 120,000 were issued as fully paid in 
exchange for its colonial predecessor's certificates, and the balance 
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was placed in reserve. The new company fired the imagination of 
British speculators and, within only months, they were paying more 
than fifty percent above par for shares in an enterprise which had 
produced little more than test parcels of ore. 
Even before the rail link from Richmond reached Cloncurry, 
the Hampden and Mount Elliott companies concluded an agreement with 
the state government to extend the railway to Mount Elliott via 
Hampden, a distance of seventy-four miles to the south of Cloncurry. 
The government agreed to construct the line and to pay half its 
estimated cost of £200,000, the other half to be furnished by the 
Mount Elliott and Hampden companies in the proportion of sixty percent 
20 
and forty percent respectively. It was a shrewd arrangement for the 
companies as the line would ensure cheap transport for incoming fuel 
and equipment for their projected smelters and for outgoing copper. 
Notwithstanding, the under-secretary for mines commented in his annual 
report for 1908 that "any dogmatic pronouncement as to its future is 
.. 21 
even now premature . 
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Whatever the reasons for the under-secretary's comment on the 
region's prospects, the companies' financial structure probably 
concerned him as the state's major copper enterprise, the Chillagoe 
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company, was experiencing financial difficulties. A leading 
characteristic of mining company promotion at the time was the 
allocation of substantial equity to purchase mining properties, one 
which had implications for a company's financial viability. By 
earmarking excessive equity as a purchase price at the outset, a 
company was heavily over-capitalising and leaving insufficient amounts 
for working capital. In such cases observes Hall, "it was not long 
before further capital had to be raised or the company reconstructed. 
Either of which processes usually meant that the capital of the mine 
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concerned was increased". Hall claims, however, that the mining 
promoting company flourished by continual reconstruction. Both the 
Hampden and Mount Elliott companies were obliged to reconstruct to 
fund their development programmes. The Hampden company, with a working 
capital of only £35,000 following the purchase of the Duchess mine, 
reconstructed in July 1909 by increasing its capitalisation and 
concluding arrangements for a debenture issue to finance its smelters. 
The Mount Elliott company with eighty percent of its nominal capital 
in the hands of the vendors of the mines was struggling to cover its 
infrastructure costs. It issued the bulk of its reserve shares in a 
financial reorganisation in late 1909. 
The mines to the north-west and west of Cloncurry - Palmtree, 
Dugald, Mount Cuthbert, Mount Oxide, Crusader, Dobbyn, Eclipse, 
Argylla and Sunset - were not developed with the same sense of 
urgency. The ore-bodies were rich, but there was no immediate 
prospect of railway extensions to reduce overheads. As the under-
secretary for mines commented in 1909, "the mines in the western and 
north-western sections of the field...notwithstanding their intrinsic 
worth, cannot hope to become profitable until railway communication 
with Cloncurry or one of the Gulf ports has been established". 
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Indeed the high costs of transport directly contributed to the 
failure of the Queensland Exploration Company which reopened the 
Great Australia mine in 1907, but which accumulated considerable 
debts to 1909 and abandoned operations. In this case, premature 
expenditure of large sums of capital prior to the completion of the 
Richmond-Cloncurry railway created liquidity problems for the company. 
A two years delay in operations would have obviated the transport 
25 
problems which absorbed large amounts of the company's capital. 
The most important company to the north-west was Mount Cuthbert No 
Liability. Registered in Victoria in 1907, with an authorised 
capital of £240,000, this company reconstructed two years later to 
finance further exploration of its reserves, although there was no 
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prospect of large scale operations in the immediate future. 
Meanwhile to the south of Cloncurry, the field was a hive 
of activity. There was a dramatic increase in population as the 
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Mount Elliott smelters approached completion. The vigour with 
which the company pursued its master plan can be attributed to the 
energy of its general manager, William Corbould, one of the 
outstanding men in Australian mining history. Corbould was 
forty-two years of age when he arrived at Mount Elliott. Born in 
Victoria, the son of a Ballarat tailor, he had graduated from the 
Ballarat School of Mines with a certificate in practical chemistry. 
In 1885, he secured employment with a Silverton company and later 
managed the venture. He also worked at the Central Broken Hill Silver 
Mine before departing for the United States in 1890. On his return 
to Australia, Corbould worked at Mount Morgan and Burraga (N.S.W.) 
when he gained a knowledge of copper. Thus his career before coming 
to Mount Elliott was relatively unspectacular, but his unconventional 
notions and driving force soon demonstrated his worth. Corbould 
remained at Mount Elliott as Managing Director of the enterprise 
until 1922. Within twelve months of his resignation he was to 
engineer the flotation of Mount Isa Mines Limited which confirmed his 
28 
abilities and reputation. 
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The mount Elliott smelters were operational by August 1910, 
and produced nearly £130,000 worth of copper in the remaining months 
of the year. Over the folloj»ing three years, the Mount Elliott works 
treated 126,822 tons of ore, and returned to the company's shareholders 
successive annual dividends of £147,518, £165,957.10.0, and 
£110,638.10.0: in total £424,000. The Hampden company under Erie 
Huntley's management had a less spectacular beginning. Its furnaces 
were not blown in until March 1911. In the same three years, the 
Hampden smelters treated 85,266 tons of ore, and returned to its 
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shareholders the first dividend of £140,000 in 1913. Shares in the 
companies were attractive propositions for investors, particularly 
overseas, as the local mining warden noted: 
That this important centre has attracted 
the eyes of the mining world is evidenced 
by the fact that English and French 
investors now hold nearly all the shares 
in the Mount Elliott Limited, and are 
large shareholders in the Hampden-
Cloncurry Copper Mines Limited, thus 
showing a growing confidence in the 
copper resources of this district which 
is admitted to be the richest copper 
belt in Australia.30 
The enterprise of the Mount Elliott and Hampden companies was 
readily praised in official circles. Before 1910, no mine had yielded 
a profit; but within only a matter of months the township of Selwyn 
with over 1,000 inhabitants had been constructed near the Mount Elliott 
mine, while at Hampden, hundreds of workers were engaged drawing wages 
considerably higher than most awards in the state. The railway and the 
tramway networks constructed by the companies contributed to the rapid 
expansion of output and mining activity. "These results are entirely 
due to railway communications", commented the warden, "a factor that 
has also largely added to the wealth of the pastoral industry in the 
31 
southern section of the field". But the sudden burst of development 
was marred by two problems not uncommon to most new mining fields: 
disease and frequent accident. Poor sanitation was blamed for a 
10 
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severe outbreak of typhoid at Malbon and Hampden in 1911, which 
provoked the warden to recommend "the installation of the closet-pan 
system - a system that should be insistedfon in all camps of any 
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size". In 1911, 109 separate accidents were reported but only one 
death and six serious injuries resulted. In 1912, the accident rate 
increased alarmingly: 150 persons were injured in 147 separate 
accidents; 13 were killed and 45 were absent from work for more than 
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a fortnight. Both management and union representatives became more 
safety conscious, but accidents at the smelters remained high. 
The production values of the two companies and the dividends 
declared and forecast by their directors were misleading in terms of 
the field's prospects. Mount Elliott seemed to be the more profitable 
but, as early as 1912, Corbould expressed concern over reserves of 
high grade ore. The directors authorised him to negotiate with the 
Hampden company for an amalgamation of interests which would overcome 
the fierce rivalry between the companies, ensure a more balanced 
development of the field, and rationalise capital overheads. But 
the Hampden company was lukewarm. Unhampered by London-based 
directors and shareholders clamouring for greater dividends, it had 
consolidated its prospects in 1911 by acquiring many promising mines 
in the region, enlarging its smelter and erecting a new converter 
34 plant. The breakdown of the amalgamation negotiations was signalled 
by the renewal of competition between the two companies to purchase 
additional mines, and the surprising manoeuvre by the Hampden company 
in placing an additional 50,000 shares at £2.10.0 each with investors 
to buy the rich Macgregor mines for £108,750 and to finance a railway 
35 link with the Duchess mine. The Mount Elliott company responded 
by either securing options on or purchasing outright the Hampden 
South Consols, the Trafalgar, the Floradora, the King's Cross, the 
King Solomon, the Danube and the Revenue mines to bolster its reserves. 
11 
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The failure of the amalgamation overtures and a fire in the 
Consols in 1913 made Corbould even more determined to provide a long 
term solution to problems of ore shortages. In late 1913, after 
conferring in London with the company's directors, he announced that 
negotiations with the Hampden company would be resumed, not for an 
amalgamation, but to consider a joint venture to develop the struggling 
northern and north-western sections of the field which still awaited a 
railway from Cloncurry. Corbould and Huntley inspected a number of 
properties north of Cloncurry, but the proposal again came to nothing. 
Instead, Mount Elliott Limited pursued the project alone. In early 
1914, it floated the Dobbyn and Cloncurry Copper Mines Limited with a 
nominal capital of £400,000 in £1 shares. The parent company retained 
190,000 of the 300,000 actually issued with a two year option on the 
37 
reserve balance. The new company lost little time acquiring the 
properties of the Queensland Exploration Company and Queensland Copper 
Freeholds Limited, a move which secured the Great Australia, the 
Argylla, the Dobbyn and other freehold mines, substantially boosting 
Mount Elliott's ore reserves when the lodes at its principal mine 
38 
were virtually exhausted. 
Thus on the eve of the outbreak of the war, the Cloncurry 
field was in the hands of Mount Elliott Limited, Hampden-Cloncurry 
Copper Mines Limited and three other companies - Mount Cuthbert No 
Liability, Corella Copper Mines No Liability and the small but 
profitable St. Mungo Copper Mines Limited, none of which had the 
39 
advantage of railway facilities. 
The Cloncurry companies experienced intermittent industrial 
unrest which proved almost as costly to smelting campaigns as shortages 
of high grade ores. From the outset, the two major companies had 
grappled with labour disputes culminating in a major confrontation 
12 
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over contract and piecework rates in 1913. Rankling disharmony 
climaxed in July that year when the Hampden company locked out its 
employees for alleged breach of contracts; Mount Elliott followed 
. 40 
suit. Labour parliamentarians, particularly William McCormack, 
the former general secretary of the Amalgamated Worker's Association, 
bitterly attacked the companies' actions, claiming that not only was 
the union justified in its opposition to labour contracts and piece 
work but also the workers were the Scapegoats in a sinister and 
calculated manoeuvre by management "to rig the share market". He 
alleged that the Hampden company had been unable to produce copper 
at cost estimates promised to shareholders, and urged the Denham 
41 government to invoke the Industrial Peace Act against the companies. 
Fully aware that his urgings would receive little ssrmpathy from a 
government which had introduced the Act to discourage strikes in the 
wake of the 1912 general strike, McCormack at least was assured of 
strong support from local unionists, one of whom complained to the 
Cloncurry Advocate that the companies were "the first in this state to 
declare industrial warfare" as a consequence of "the erratic ways" of 
42 
"grasping individuals" who influenced management policy. To 
resolve the dispute which, according to the Cloncurry Advocate, was 
causing considerable hardship and jeopardising the field's reputation 
among investors, Mr. Justice McNaughton convened a compulsory 
conference at which an agreement was concluded. In his annual 
report, the warden observed that the settlement "has since been 
43 loyally observed by both parties to the dispute". This was 
largely due to the influence and authority exercised by the A.W.A. 
organiser, Jack Dash, who had unionised the field in 1910 and 
subsequently held a tight rein on his members to avoid wild-cat 
, 44 
strikes potentially damaging to the union's bargaining position. 
The outbreak of war in Europe forced the Hampden company 
to breach the 1913 agreement. In order to continue operations after 
the dislocation of world metal markets, the company found it necessary 
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"to make an arrangement by which their employees agreed to accept half 
wages and take the balance when the copper won should be sold". Though 
threatened at one time by a further decline in copper prices, the 
agreement survived until market quotations advanced to £60 per ton 
45 
which made it possible to restore award wages. 
The first world war conferred four years of prosperity on the 
Cloncurry district, although the northern and north-western sections 
of the field remained handicapped by inadequate transport. The 
marketing difficulties created by the outbreak of war - the bulk of 
Cloncurry copper had been contracted to German manufacturers - were 
overcome with the demand from the Imperial government for munitions. 
Prices for copper (and lead) soared, from a high of £66 per ton in 
1914 to £153 per ton in 1916. Copper producers were able to mine and 
treat medium grade and blended ores at a handsome profit. On the 
Cloncurry field, two additional smelters were erected to take 
advantage of war-time conditions. West from Cloncurry the Corella 
Copper Company No Liability was active for nearly four years. Formed 
in October 1912 with a modest share capital of £12,500, this small 
company acquired properties within easy access of the Hampden 
company's Macgregor mines which were linked by a light railway to 
Hampden. The company erected a small aging smelter at its mines and 
between May 1915 and June 1917 processed nearly 24,000 tons of ore 
46 before the lodes were abandoned and the company liquidated. 
To the north-west of Cloncurry, attention focused on the 
Mount Cuthbert company whose mines included Mount Cuthbert, Kalkadoon, 
Mighty Atom, Orphan and Little Wonder. Since 1909, the company had 
been plagued by financial difficulties. Reconstruction to erase a 
deficit of £15,000 in 1912 provided only temporary relief. When the 
state government allocated funds to construct a railway in two stages 
from Cloncurry to Mount Cuthbert, the company's directors formalised 
plans for the erection of smelters. Although the railway reached the 
14 
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Dugald River in 1913, the second stage was not completed until late 
1915, retarding the development of the company's mines and 
necessitating a £70,000 debenture issue and further financial 
reconstruction to provide the £100,000 required to implement its 
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plans. Meanwhile, the Mount Elliott company agreed to smelt Mount 
Cuthbert ores on tribute, and for nearly two years the added cost of 
rail haulage to Mount Elliott absorbed substantial sums which the 
Mount Cuthbert company could ill-afford. The Mount Cuthbert 
furnaces were blown in during the early months of 1917, and in the 
initial smelting campaign treated over 25,000 tons of copper ore. 
Had not labour disputes curtailed operations over the following two 
years, the company probably would have discharged its debts. 
The Hampden company paid handsome dividends during the war 
years, 1915-18: £40,000, £140,000, £52,500 and £35,000, making a 
total disbursement of £437,500 since commencing operations. Its 
smelters treated over a quarter of a million tons of ore in this 
period, averaging over 70,000 tons annually. Huntley, the general 
manager, pursued a policy of extending light railways to the 
company's mines to ensure sustained ore supplies and reduce transport 
costs. The Hampden company was fortunate that all of its mines were 
in the southern section of the field, in contrast to the Mount 
Elliott company whose most promising mines were over a hundred miles 
48 to the north of the smelters. The problem of transport was not the 
only matter which concerned Corbould and the Mount Elliott directors. 
The exhaustion of high and medium grade ores in the Consols and the 
parent mine at Selwyn deprived the company of profits from war time 
copper prices. Anxious to regain its position of paramountcy on the 
field, the company allocated substantial sums for development work at 
its northern mines, the enlargement of the smelters and the erection 
49 
of a refining works at Bowen to process blister copper. In 1917 
when its treatment works were remodelled, a new wave of industrial 
unrest restricted operations. In fact, all companies on the field 
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were affected by strikes, adding to the persistent problems of lack of 
50 
water, shortages of skilled labour and scarcity of fuels. 
Industrial dislocation, exacerbated by the influx of I.W.W. 
workers (or Wobblies), was a constant worry for company managers. 
Even the A.W.U., the established union on the field, was concerned 
that several long-standing unionists who had enlisted in the armed 
forces were being replaced by militants unaccustomed to A.W.U. methods. 
In fact, all major mining ventures throughout Australia were 
experiencing labour difficulties, and companies were compelled to 
employ men less skilled in mining and smelting practices. When the 
A.W.U. northern district organiser visited the Cloncurry field in 
mid-1917 he noted with alarm that his union was losing credit with 
many workers: 
We get an award, and there is no one 
to see that the award is carried out. 
If it is not carried out the men have 
to use direct action to get what they 
are legally entitled to, and that is 
what is giving the I.W.W. a strong 
hold in this and other districts.52 
The Cloncurry Advocate estimated that there were nearly 100 I.W.W. 
activists on the field, and claimed that the A.W.U., smarting from 
the attacks of I.W.W. local leaders who labelled it "a bosses' union", 
was demanding a show of union tickets by workers under A.W.U. awards. 
One area severely disaffected by I.W.W. activists was Mount Cuthbert, 
although in 1917 they were out-manoeuvred in a dispute over contract 
work when the A.W.U. negotiated a settlement. The Cloncurry Advocate 
subsequently counselled unionists to be wary of I.W.W. agitators: 
The I.W.W. has been trying to bring off a 
strike here for some time, but found that 
it had bumped up against something very 
solid and instead of meeting with success 
it had met with defeat. If every other 
centre does the same as Mt. Cuthbert, 
Stewart, Donovan and the rest of the 
I.W.W. will pass out of existence, and 
will not be able to boast of having 
gained control of the industries of 
the west.53 
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Increased award wages in the latter part of the year averted more 
strike activity, although in October 1917 the Mount Elliott smelters 
closed down for several months after men refused to work until a new 
furnace had been reduced in size from 28 to 18 feet on grounds of 
^ . 54 safety. 
The following year again witnessed a spate of industrial 
stoppages. In January 1918 operations were halted at Mount Cuthbert 
when workers struck in support of unionists engaged by the management 
but subsequently laid off when insufficient work was available at the 
smelters. The A.W.U. demanded successfully that the company reimburse 
the redundant workers their fares and expenses to Townsville. Nine 
months later, the same unionists supported woodcutters and carters who 
refused to handle a contractor's firewood. In this instance, the 
Premier, E.G. Theodore, who was in Cloncurry, intervened and effected 
a settlement. The Duchess mine was closed for most of the year as 
miners refused to work under the mine manager, Evans. At Mount 
Elliott, a strike was called over the dismissal of an engine driver, 
Heyfron. In the following December, Mount Elliott workers complained 
of victimisation of a dismissed crane driver: Corbould responded 
to their demands for his re-instatement by closing down the smelters 
until the new year. The last major strike on the field occurred 
at Mount Cuthbert in November 1919, again over the dismissal of a 
unionist who refused to obey a foreman's instructions. In this case, 
the. men soon capitulated, aware that the tenuous state of the metal 
market could cost them their jobs permanently. The degree of 
industrial dishairmony in the region was summed up several years later 
by John Mullan, the Labour member for the district, in a letter to 
Corbould who was then at Mount Isa: 
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Matters seem to be progressing satisfactorily 
at Mount Isa. There is a fine body of men 
working there. There is, of course, a 
sprinkling of Communists, but not 
sufficient to create industrial unrest. 
When I think of the difficulties with the 
I.W.W. who were at Mt. Elliott and other 
places, I fully realize how you were 
handicapped in those days.57 
As Blainey comments, "most people in the Cloncurry copper belt 
58 
counted 1918 a wonderful year". The Mount Elliott smelters treated 
77,452 tons of ore, Hampden 75,301 tons and Mount Cuthbert 36,466 tons; 
the total output was valued at £1,373,927.6.6 and but for industrial 
stoppages it might have amounted to £1.5 million. Mining authorities 
and Queensland legislators had forecast that world copper prices would 
59 be sustained at a high level for years to come. However, prices 
slumped as wartime demands ceased, plunging the mining industry into 
a recession. From December 1918 when the Imperial government released 
controls on the copper market, prices depreciated from £112 per ton to 
£75 per ton in April 1919, little more than the cost of realisation for 
Cloncurry producers. The Hampden and Mount Cuthbert companies 
postponed their smelting programmes for the year: they resumed short 
campaigns in September and October respectively. In contrast, Mount 
Elliott management conducted a brief campaign in the first quarter of 
1919 smelting some 20,000 tons of ore and returning £85,405 worth of 
copper. This company was less concerned with profits than with 
efficiency of operations, as the campaign was staged to prove to the 
directors and a group of visiting American engineers and metallurgists 
that medium grade ores treated on a large-scale could still yield good 
results. Nevertheless, 1919 was a year best forgotten by the Cloncurry 
companies as the total value of output was £1 million less than for 
1918.^° 
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A temporary rally in world copper prices in 1920 afforded 
little relief: copper quotations dropped from £122 per ton in 
February to £72 per ton in December. Cloncurry producers were 
hampered by local conditions as well. Capital investment had 
diminished when dividends ceased. With the exhaustion of high yield 
surface ores, realisation costs escalated. More important, overheads 
rose when the Commonwealth government imposed tariffs on mining 
machinery and when workers insisted on maintaining high wage levels. 
The crucial factor was the shipping strikes of 1920 which held up 
supplies of coke, explosives and machinery parts on the one hand, and 
denied access to overseas markets on the other hand. Indeed, the 
under-secretary's forecast that the outlook for 1921 "was not 
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encouraging was an understatement. 
1920 heralded the demise of the Cloncurry field. The Mount 
Elliott company which had suspended smelting in March 1919 confined 
itself to development work at Mount Oxide, and concentrated on raising 
additional capital to finance the treatment of low grade sulphide 
ores. It turned to New York financiers through the U.S. firm of 
Hayden Stone and Company. The smelter superintendent visited the 
United States to study new treatment processes, but died abroad, 
almost simultaneously with the decision of Hayden Stone and Company 
not to renew their option to raise capital on the company's behalf, 
as their efforts had been handicapped by the exchange rate. The 
Hampden company, now relying solely on the Trekelano mine for copper 
ores, and the Mount Cuthbert company, burdened by liquidity problems, 
were forced to halt operations when the Commonwealth Bank withdrew 
the wartime arrangements of advancing funds on copper awaiting 
. 62 
export. 
Closure of the smelters had an immediate impact on the 
population of the region. Most mining and smelting workers collected 
their possessions and departed for Townsville and to southern capital 
cities: those who remained turned to the state government for relief. 
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Whereas prior to 1919 the state commitment to the mining industry in 
north-west Queensland was limited to railway construction, advances 
on roads, bridges, water supply and mining machinery under the 1906 
Act, and the setting up of a government assay office at Cloncurry, 
the Theodore government Introduced several expedient measures to 
alleviate hardships created by the companies' suspension of 
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operations. In 1919, the Cloncurry assay office advanced to miners 
assistance at a rate of 30 shillings per week for single men and 40 
shillings per week for married men on their undertaking to refund 
such amounts from the proceeds of ores sold to the state. In 1921, 
the scope of assistance was expanded by a guarantee of a minimum 
price of £75 per ton for ores sold to the Chillagoe state smelters. 
Rail concessions on ores freighted to Chillagoe were also Introduced 
64 to encourage gougers and tribute parties to remain at Cloncurry. 
While benefiting individual miners, these schemes provided little 
incentive for the companies which alone had the capacity to resurrect 
the field. It was not until 1929, in one of the last actions of the 
McCormack administration, that a royal commission into the mining 
Industry was set up to seek solutions and recommend government 
initiatives. By then It was too late: Cloncurry's fate was 
determined. 
During the 1920's, the Mount Elliott company repeatedly 
attempted to revive the Cloncurry field. While the local mining 
warden was describing 1921 as a year of "stagnation", Corbould was in 
London trying to raise £360,000 for a new treatment plant and a 
railway to Mount Oxide. He failed and resigned. For many local 
workers who were observing the Hampden company dismantling some of its 
smelting plant and machinery for shipment to its mines in Papua, this 
dashed all hopes of the field's revival. However, the Mount Elliott 
company remained optimistic, but three factors were prerequisite to 
resuming operations: a rise in the price of copper to a minimum of 
£85 per ton; an amalgamation or at least a joint venture with Hampden 
Cloncurry Copper Mines Limited to treat ores at a centrally located 
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smelter; and additional capital to finance new work. A survey of the 
estimated reserves and the financial position of the two companies 
revealed that they were in desperate straits. Mount Elliott Limited 
claimed reserves of 1.876 million tons of ore with an estimated 
copper yield of 4.3 percent; the Hampden company's totalled 135,000 
tons, 42,000 of which assayed at 10 percent and the balance at 3.1 
percent, and an additional 70,000 tons in fluxes. Thus the combined 
reserves were sufficient to support a large mining concern, but extra 
working capital was necessary. The Mount Elliott company's assets 
were valued at £42,569 and it was out of debt, despite a loss of 
£15,842 for 1922, after placing 120,000 participating priority shares 
out of an issue of half a million. The Hampden company claimed 
liquid assets of £27,057 and £97,730 in shares in other companies. 
Neither company was viable separately, and a rationalisation of 
interests was the only hope. Consequently, negotiations on 
amalgamation were held, although the geographical separation of the 
two boards of directors delayed any prompt agreement. No sooner was a 
draft scheme for amalgamation on the equity basis of Mount Elliott 
65 percent and Hampden 35 percent approved in principle than the 
Mount Elliott company announced that it had acquired through Brandeis, 
Goldschmidt and Company, Melbourne, the Mount Cuthbert properties for 
an undisclosed sum, certainly much less than the valuation of half a 
68 
million pounds placed on the Mount Cuthbert assets. This move 
strengthened Mount Elliott's position, as the company's ore reserves 
were effectively increased by 193,500 tons assaying 4^ to IH percent 
copper, almost double that of the Hampden reserves. Further, it 
effectively isolated the Hampden company in the southern section of the 
field where ore bodies were almost exhausted (only the Trekelano mine 
was considered valuable), and gave the Mount Elliott company a monopoly 
on the northern section, where alone sizable reserves remained. Soon 
after, negotiations were broken off, coming as a shock even to the 
chairman of the Hampden company, William Orr, who detected perfidy 
64 in Mount Elliott's strategy. It can be suggested that it was a 
calculated manoeuvre designed to force the Hampden company out of the 
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region. The suggestion is evidenced by the Hampden company's decision, 
conscious that even limited operations would prove uneconomic, to offer 
its assets for sale by tender in 1926, and by Mount Elliott's 
acquisition of its properties, with the exception of Trekelano, soon 
after. The Hampden company was struck from the share register in 
1928. For its part. Mount Elliott Limited, which had strived so hard 
to secure a monopoly over the field's mines since 1912, Ironically 
never produced another ton of copper for two reasons: depressed copper 
prices continued for another decade; and the company was unable to 
overcome financial difficulties. 
The acquisition of the Mount Cuthbert properties impinged 
on Mount Elliott's capital reserves, but not as much as the costly 
gamble of constructing a metallurgical plant at Cloncurry to treat 
ores by an electro-chemical process in 1926. Although completed the 
works were never commissioned as the London directors ordered their 
closure when expectations of improved world copper prices failed to 
materialise. In 1929, the directors increased the company's capital 
by Issuing 800,000 preferred ordinary shares at 10 shillings each to 
finance the recommencement of operations in 1930. The offer to 
subscribers was accompanied by a statement on negotiations with the 
Queensland government for a road for motor traffic from Dobbyn to 
Mount Oxide, and special rail freight rates, in addition to pledges 
of support for a petition to the Commonwealth government seeking 
72 
exemptions from duties on machinery Imports. In early 1930, the 
company's annual meeting was Informed that plans for reopening the 
mines and treatment works had been deferred indefinitely on the new 
general manager's advice, partly because the state and Commonwealth 
governments refused to grant concessions, and partly because of 
continuing low world copper prices. The capital which the company 
raised was used to acquire a substantial Interest in the South 
73 American Copper Company Limited in Venezuela. 
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The few gougers remaining on the Cloncurry field turned to 
Mount Isa Mines Limited to restore their hopes, but the new company 
was concentrating on lead production and was experiencing its own 
financial difficulties. It was not until the outbreak of war in the 
Pacific that copper mining revived. With plant acquired from Mount 
Elliott's three smelters on the Cloncurry field for a sum of £2,300, 
Mount Isa converted to treating copper ores from its own deposits and 
the Cloncurry mines then worked on tribute arrangements with Mount 
Elliott by parties of gougers. Between 1943 and 1946 copper valued at 
nearly £3.5 million was produced. When Mount Isa reverted to lead 
production in 1946, and the state smelters at Chillagoe were auctioned, 
the Cloncurry mines closed again. Mount Elliott Limited was finally 
liquidated in 1953. 
In retrospect, the collapse of the Cloncurry copper empire 
can be attributed to a number of factors. Clearly the unpredictable 
movements in world metal prices were important and beyond the control 
of the companies. Labour disputes also cost the companies dearly, but 
nearly all mining enterprises in Australia were afflicted by labour 
problems during the war years. However, there were flaws in 
management strategies from the outset. First, Mount Elliott's decision 
in 1908 to construct its smelters at Selwyn was shortsighted. 
L.C. Ball's 1908 geological survey disclosed that the copper deposits 
were located over an area of several hundred square miles to the north, 
west and south of Cloncurry. By locating its smelters at the southern 
end of the field near the Mount Elliott deposits, the company was 
confining the ambit of its operations. Had it sited the smelters at 
Cloncurry it would have been able to draw on ore supplied from mines to 
the north and west of the town to supplement ores from the Mount Elliott 
mine once the rich surface lodes were exhausted. By 1913 the cost of 
freighting ores from its northern properties offset the profits from 
the Consols mine which had been acquired to sustain smelting operations. 
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Second, the rivalry between Mount Elliott Limited and the Hampden 
company and their failure to amalgamate in 1912 not only proved 
expensive for both companies, but also contributed to the haphazard 
development of the field. Corbould foresaw the folly of competition 
but the Hampden company, having acquired the Duchess, Trekelano and 
Answer mines in the southern section of the field, was confident that 
it had secured sufficient reserves to assure its future. When Mount 
Elliott retaliated by purchasing the Consols and a number of other 
mines north-west of Cloncurry, the Hampden company outlayed over 
£100,000 for the Macgregor group to consolidate its ascendancy. In 
short, the rush by both companies to acquire additional freehold 
properties at inflated prices greatly reduced their working capital 
and overcapitalised mines which still required substantial expenditure 
to tap the lodes. Had Corbould's amalgamation proposals received more 
intensive scrutiny by the Hampden directors, who no doubt rejected the 
scheme on the grounds of imminent dividends, considerable unnecessary 
expenditure would have been avoided. Even the under-secretary for 
mines commented: "Combinations may, no doubt, be prejudicial to the 
interests of the community, but where, as in the present instance, they 
make for efficiency and economy, they deserve all the encouragement 
74 that can be extended to them". Third, both companies erred in 
declaring sizable dividends in the early stages of operations. Had 
dividends been more moderate and portion of the profits transferred to 
a capital reserve fund, the companies could have financed exploration 
and new machinery at the mines, and transport facilities and new 
treatment plant for the smelters, when high grade ores were depleted, 
rather than seeking additional funds through reconstructing the 
companies periodically. Once dividends ceased, it was more difficult 
to raise further working capital from disheartened Investors. Fourth, 
the failure of the companies to adopt new treatment methods directly 
contributed to higher realisation costs, ultimately influencing the 
closure of the smelters on the Cloncurry field. The companies relied 
on conventional methods of ore dressing by gravity mills, and smelting 
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by blast furnaces. Treatment of ores assaying less than ten percent 
copper content was a dubious economic proposition. Copper flotation, 
which had been successfully used in the United States since 1912, 
achieved a recovery rate twenty percent higher than gravity 
concentration. In fact, Blainey claims the success of the flotation 
method of treatment was a major factor in the recession of metal 
prices in the 1920's. In 1917, Corbould acquired a small flotation 
mill from the Great Fitzroy mine. The experiments conducted at Mount 
Elliott were inconclusive, and the mill was closed down. By the 
early 1920's there were very few copper producers not employing 
flotation treatment plants, and it was not surprising that the 
under-secretary for mines commented in 1926 that the depression in the 
base metal industry in Queensland was "due primarily to obsoleteness 
of plant and methods of treatment". 
It was not until the 1950's that Mount Isa Mines reinstated 
the reputation of the north-western Queensland mineral fields as the 
country's leading copper producer. However, it was during the 1920's 
that its management made several decisions vital to the field's 
future development. Ironically the decisions were William Corbould's. 
He founded Mount Isa Mines Limited in 1924, and was its first managing 
director. He appointed a geologist as general manager to test the ore 
reserves over an extensive area; he directed the search for capital 
and after several setbacks secured the support of London financiers; 
and he negotiated the extension of a railway from Duchess to Mount Isa, 
even though a number of the cabinet ministers who approved its 
construction were later accused of trafficking in Mount Isa shares. 
Further, Corbould endeavoured to test new treatment methods, and from 
his lead, the company maintained a tradition of consciousness of 
metallurgical innovations. In 1937 when the enterprise yielded a 
profit, no dividends were declared, and over the succeeding decade all 
profits were reinvested in the company's future. In many respects. 
Mount Isa Mines avoided the pitfalls which had brought down the 
Cloncurry copper giants. 
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* Treated by Mount Elliott smelters 
by agreement prior to furnace 
completion at Mount Cuthbert. 
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